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tion or non-recommendation is not reviewable by the appellate courts, 6
that some courts refuse to allow evidence directed specifically toward a
recommendation of mercy,"7 and the statement that the recommenda-
tion of mercy is not an issue of the case,"5 coupled with the refusal of the
courts to charge on such evidence,'" would tend to indicate that this
recommendation is not based on the evidence presented in the case, but
rather on the jury's impression of the man himself."0
It has been said that "a career of crime, sociologically conceived, is
the culmination of a complex series of inevitable forces at work in the
physical and social environment of the individual."'" This statement
represents the almost universal present-day thought on this question.
Hence, it would seem best that the courts allow the jury to follow the
rule laid down by Saleilles. "When it comes to determining the pen-
alty, it is the entire man in totality of his moral nature that must be
considered and not the fragmentary and incidental part of himself that
has found expression in the crime committed. 2
E. P.T.
EQUITY
EQUITY - MUTUALITY IN SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
OF REQUIREMENTS CONTRACTS
The plaintiff, a gasoline station owner and operator, bought and
paid cash for stock in the defendant corporation, owner and operator
of a bus line, under a contract whereby the defendant promised to buy,
and plaintiff to sell, all the defendant's requirements of gasoline, oil and
grease at reduced prices, so long as the plaintiff should hold the stock.'
The plaintiff asked an injunction to prevent the defendant from pur-
chasing his requirements elsewhere. The injunction was granted, the
court holding that mutuality of obligation is not essential to the specific
" Hoppe v. State, 29 Ohio App. 467, 163 N.E. 715 (2928) Aiken v. State, 170
Ga. 895 ,14 S.E. 3 6S (1930).
"2 Ashbrook v. State, 49 Ohio App. z98, 197 N.E. 214 (93).
" dshbrook v. State, 49 Ohio App. 298, 197 N.E. z4 (1935)j State v. Martin,
9z N.J.L. 436, xo6 Atl. 385, 17 A.L.R. iogo (ixgi).
1'0 Supra, note x6.
"State v. Caldwdl, 13 Ohio Op. 98 (1938), overruled in 134 Ohio St. 424 (2939).
"A Brill and Payne (x ed. 1938), "THE ADOLESCENT COURT AND CRIME PREVEN-
TION," p. 13.
-0 SALEILLES (I ed. 1913), "INDIVIDUALIZATION OF PUNisnaEirr," p. x65.
" Note that this contract presents some features of an option, a unilateral contract,
and a bilateral contract. If it is construed as a bilateral contract, plaintiff would be con-
sidercd as promising in the alternative either to supply the defendant's requirements or to
sell his stock. Since either performance would be sufficient consideration if it alone were
bargained for, the promise is not illusory. I American Law Institute Restatement of op
J,aw of Contract,, §79.
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enforcement of the contract as against the purchaser, where there is an
independent consideration for the purchaser's obligation to buy, and that
mutuality of remedy is not a requirement for specific performance,2
overruling Steinau v. The Gas Co.'
The question of mutuality of remedy which the defendant raised has
troubled courts of equity in this country for nearly a century. Briefly
stated, it is, may one party to a contract be granted specific performance
simply because the other party would have been entitled to it in a suit
at his instance? And, conversely, must equity deny this relief to a suitor
whose right is otherwise unquestionable, for the sole reason that his
adversary for one reason or another would not have been given specific
performance? This second, or negative, aspect of the question was
presented in the case of Hills v. Crol l .4 In that case the nature of the
plaintiff's obligation was such that a decree in equity could not have
compelled its performance,' and the chancellor concluded that this fact
must defeat the plaintiff's suit. In the instant case the defendant is in
much the same position. A decree of specific performance, or its prac-
tical equivalent, an injunction against the breach of a negative covenant,
would not issue against the plaintiff if the defendant desired it, not only
because the court could not require him to continue to supply the
defendant's requirements, but also because he had the power to termi-
nate the contract, and so could render the decree nugatory. An appli-
cation of the rule of Hills v. Croll,' followed in Steinau v. The Gas Co.,7
would have required the dismissal of this suit, but the Supreme Court
of Ohio has abrogated the rule. An increasing volume of authority
supports this decision.' The principle of mutuality of remedy has been
questioned by able writers, and shown to be so riddled with exceptions
that little of substance remains of the rule.9 There is little support for
the affirmative proposition to be found in the English decisions, but the
courts of several jurisdictions in this country, attracted by the plaus-
ibility of the rule, still follow the Hills case. 6 The Restatement of Con-
tracts denies the existence of the negative aspect of the rule, but admits
2 135 Ohio St. 509, 21 N.E. (2d) 669 (939).
' 48 Ohio St. 324,27 N.E. 545 (I891).
4 2 Phillips 6o (1845).




8 Eckstein v. Downing, 64 N.H. 248, 9 Atl. 6z6, so Am. St. Rep. 404 (s886);
Porter v. The Land and Water Co., 84 Me. 195, 24 Atl. 814. (1892).
'Ames, Mutuality in Specific Performancei 3 Col. L. Rev. s, Clark, Some Problems
in Specific Performance, 3 Harv. L. Rev. 271.
"° Spra, note 4. Cf. Thompson v. The Shell Petroleum Corp., 130 Fla. 652, 178 So.
413, 17 A.L.R. 248 (1938).
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that the principle may still be influential in granting equitable relief
where the measure of damages in an action at law would be hard to
determine."
In the case at hand, however, there is a question of mutuality which
is more substantial. Since the plaintiff may by selling his stock put an
end to his obligation, should the defendant be compelled to perform? If
one party to a wholly executory contract has the power of termination,
he can gain an advantage by its exercise over the helpless defendant,
whose performance has been compelled. Accordingly, specific per-
formance will never be decreed in favor of one having the power of
termination unless the agreed exchange can be secured to the defendant.
The unilateral contract presents no such difficulty; the defendant has
received the benefits of full performance. Similarly, where an inde-
pendant consideration is the basis of the defendant's obligation, as in the
case of an option, there is no such question of mutuality. The Supreme
Court of Ohio, in the principal case, considered the contract to be in
the nature of an option. If this is the case-and certainly the contract
does present some aspects of an option-there is no want of mutuality
of obligation. But it is suggested that since the plaintiff's obligation to
supply the deefndant's requirements is unperformed, and that obligation
is terminable at the plaintiff's will, the question of mutuality persists.
Whether this right of termination by one party requires the court
to refuse specific performance has been the subject of some conflict in
the reported cases. The proposition that the relief should be denied on
this basis alone is unsupported by the English decisions, although there
is some authority in this country to that effect, notably Rutland Marble
Co. v. Ripley."u More recent cases, however, adopt the sounder view
that unless the plaintiff's right of termination makes security to the
defendant impossible, it will not preclude granting the relief. 3
"In the illustrations to z A.L.I. Restatement of Contracts, § 37z, sub-section z,
the following example is given:
"A makes a bilateral contract for the sale of Blackaere to B for $5,ooo. On
breach by B, prior to conveyance, A can get a decree for the payment of the
full price, conditional on proper conveyance. A's remedy in damages would be
a judgment for $5,ooo less the market vaue of the land, the conveyance of
x hich B has prevented. Since this remedy is of doubtful adequacy, and since B
could get a decree for specific performance, the court gives a like remedy to A."
I0 Wall. (U. S.) 339, I9 L. Ed. 95S (1870); and cf. Rust v. Conrad, 47 Mich.
449, xi N.W. z65, 41 Am. Rep. 72o (iSSz). The decision of this case was recalled by
,tatute. Laws of Mich., 1SS3, act no. 73.
1 5 Zellchen v. Lynch, So Kan. 746, io4. Pac. 563, 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 659 (19o9);
St. Joseph Hydraulic Co. v. Globe Tissue Paper Co., x56 Ind. 665, 59 N.E. 995 (i9o);
Singer Sczving Machine Co. v. Union Buttonhole Co., zz Fed. Cases zzo (1873) McCall
v. Wriht, 198 N. Y. I43, 95 N.E. 516, 31 L.R.A. (N.S.) Z49; Philadelphia Ball Club
v. Lajoie, zoz Pa. zio, 5 At. 973, 58 L.R.A. ZZ7, 90 Am. St. Rep. 6Z7 (190Z)5 Grove
v. Hedes, 55 Pa. 504 (I867)5 Thompson v. Shell Petroleum Corp. (938), supra,
note Io.
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This "security" to the defendant need only consist of some form of
assurance to the court that the plaintiff will perform his obligation. In
Zelleken v. Lynch, 4 the court found that the plaintiff's expenditure of
a considerable sum in developing the leases in question was satisfactory
proof of his intention to perform. Sometimes the fact that the plaintiff
has elected to bring suit is considered sufficient.1 5 This consideration is
of less magnitude, however, in the principal case, as the contemplated
performance is concurrent. In this situation a conditional decree affords
adequate protection to the defendant.16 Under such a decree, the plain-
tiff's right is made contingent upon his continued performance, and the
defendant is fully protected. J. R. E.
EVIDENCE
EVIDENCE - HUSBAND AND WIFE - GENERAL INCOM-
PETENCY TO TESTIFY AGAINST EACH OTHER IN
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Defendant was indicted and found guilty of cutting with intent to
wound one Delia Wright. The trial court, over defendant's objection,
permitted his wife to testify against him as a witness for the state. From
the action of the trial court overruling a motion for a new trial, defend-
ant prosecuted appeal. In reversing the conviction and remanding the
cause, the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, applying the perti-
nent statute.' found the language to "exclude the possibility of con-
struing it as implying an intention to clothe the wife with a general
competency as a witness against her husband."'
The Ohio statute provides in part: "No person shall be disqualified
as a witness in a criminal prosecution by reason of his interest in the
event thereof as a party or otherwise, or by reason of his conviction of
crime. Husband and wife shall be competent witnesses to testify in
behalf of each other in all criminal prosecutions, and to testify against
each other in all actions, prosecutions, and proceedings for personal
injury of either by the other . . . ", It is well settled that the removal
1 Supra, note 13.
1" Philadelphia Ball Club v. Laioie, supra, note 13.
16 Gt. Lakes & St. Louis Transportation Co. v. Scranton Coal Co., 5Sz C.C.A. 437,
239 Fed. 603 (1917); Elk Refining Co. v. Falling Rock Cannel Coal Co., 9z W. Va.
479, 5I5 S.E. 431 (192z); Fuchs v. Motor Stage Inc., 6z Ohio App. 20 (939); z A.L.I.
Restatement of Contracts, § 372, comment.
1 Ohio G.C. sec. 13444-2.
' State v. Goodin, 6o Ohio App. 362, 14 Ohio Op. 244, z8 Ohio L. Abs. 4zI (1939).
a Ohio G.C., supra, note x.
